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Staff Use of Force in United States Confinement 
Settings 
Steve J. Martin* 
Pleasure in cruelty is really not extinct today; only, given our 
greater delicacy, that pleasure has had to undergo a certain 
sublimation. It has to be translated into imaginative and 
psychological terms in order to pass muster before even the 
tenderest hypocritical conscience.1  
The use of physical force to control prisoners is a lamentable but 
necessary and common-place event in the day-to-day administration 
of American prisons and jails.2 Correctional staff are permitted by 
law “to use force in many circumstances, including protecting 
themselves or others, protecting property, enforcing orders, 
[preventing crimes and escapes,] and maintaining . . . [the] safety and 
security” of their facilities.3 These circumstances undeniably occur 
with some frequency in prisons and jails.  
 
 * Correctional consultant; former General Counsel, Texas Department of Corrections; 
B.S. and M.A. in Correctional Administration, Sam Houston State University; J.D., University 
of Tulsa School of Law. This statement was prepared for the Commission on Safety and Abuse 
in America’s Prisons for Hearings on April 20, 2005, in Tampa, Florida. I want to thank John 
Boston of the New York City Legal Aid Society who took time out of his always busy schedule 
to share his comments on the first draft of my testimony prepared for the Commission. 
 1. FRIEDRICH NIETZCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 
200 (F. Golffing trans., Doubleday 1956) (1887). 
 2. The Texas prison system in 2001 recorded over 6,089 major applications of force with 
a system-wide population of 145,000 prisoners. TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SELECT 
STATISTICS: APRIL 2002, at 1 (2002). The New York City Department of Corrections in 2002 
recorded 1,135 use of force incidents with a system-wide population of over 14,000 prisoners. 
N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR., BUREAU CHIEF OF SECURITY STATISTICAL YEARLY REPORT, at 
tbl.1 (2003).  
 3. William C. Collins, Jail Design and Operation and the Constitution, NAT’L INST. OF  
CORRECTIONS, 1998, at 34, http://www.nicic.org (type “Jail Design” in the “Search the 
Library” text box and click “Go”; then scroll down and follow “Jail Design and Operation and 
the Constitution” hyperlink). 
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Because staff use of force is inherently dangerous, both to 
prisoners and staff due to the high risk of injury, especially when 
non-lethal weaponry such as batons, chemical agents, and projectiles 
are employed,4 both nationally recognized standards and the courts 
place limitations on when force is appropriate, the amount of force 
employed, and when force must cease. Judicial standards prohibit the 
wanton infliction of pain.5 Professional standards clearly limit staff 
use of force to that which is necessary to control prisoner disorder. 
They do not permit the use of force to control and punish, control and 
retaliate, control and deter, or control and inflict pain or injury 
(unless that pain and injury is a necessary result of lawfully applied 
control tactics). Moreover, it is not appropriate, even where force is 
justified for purposes of order and safety, to use tactics that 
needlessly involve a greater likelihood of physical injury and pain 
than necessary to achieve control of the prisoner.  
Corporal punishment is illegal in American corrections. It was 
effectively banned in 1968 as a result of Jackson v. Bishop,6 in which 
Eighth Circuit Judge (later Supreme Court Justice) Harry Blackmun 
said that the practice, in Arkansas prisons, of whipping prisoners with 
a leather strap “offends contemporary concepts of decency and 
human dignity.”7 The American Correctional Association, in its 
Manual of Correctional Standards,8 had earlier recommended that 
“[c]orporal punishment should never be used under any 
circumstances.”9 
This paper does not focus on staff use of force employed for the 
singular purpose of punishment, reprisal, or retaliation. It is an 
unfortunate reality of confinement operations that rogue officers, 
rogue shifts, and rogue commands sometimes dispense outright 
corporal punishment on their charges. When such indefensible 
 
 4. In one large metropolitan jail system the author monitored, for over two years, injuries 
to either staff or inmates from use of force incidents, which occurred in approximately 40% of 
the total number of incidents reported. 
 5. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986).  
 6. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 7. Id. at 579. 
 8. COMM. FOR REVISION OF 1954 MANUAL, AM. CORR. ASSOC., MANUAL OF 
CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS (1966). 
 9. Id. at 251. 
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incidents come to light they speak for themselves and hopefully 
trigger a series of remedial and disciplinary actions that prospectively 
eliminate or minimize such unlawful staff action. 
What this paper does focus on is the more insidious pattern or 
practice of unlawful staff use of force that is cloaked with or 
protected by an air of legitimacy or facial validity. It is not 
uncommon for ostensibly lawful applications of physical force to 
mask the intentional infliction of punishment, retaliation or reprisal 
on prisoners. Manufacturing or exaggerating the need to physically 
control a prisoner is one means by which staff pretextually use force 
for inflicting punishment on a prisoner. An application of force that is 
legitimately initiated but which escalates to a level of force 
disproportionate to the objective risks presented by the inmate can 
likewise be used pretextually by correctional personnel to punish 
prisoners. On those occasions in which unnecessary or 
disproportionate force is applied for the primary purpose of inflicting 
punishment, retaliation, or reprisal, rather than control, such 
application of force constitutes de facto corporal punishment 
regardless of its ostensible justification. Often times the subjects of 
such force are mentally ill offenders whose behavior, as viewed by 
inadequately trained officers, is to be punished rather than treated. 
The temptation to engage in de facto corporal punishment is 
reinforced by the wide range of high-tech, non-lethal weaponry 
available to correctional personnel: electronic stunning devices (some 
of which are capable of delivering 50,000 volts and can be used with 
shields, darts and probes),10 sting-shot rubber bullets, stun guns 
(canvas bags filled with lead shot or canisters filled with wood blocks 
or rubber pellets fired from a thirty-seven millimeter (37mm) gas 
gun), “pepper spray” (a type of tear gas made from cayenne peppers 
developed in Canada to control bears), and a variety of restraint 
devices such as the restraint chair and the “Body Guard” (advertised 
as a “revolutionary new design that allows police officers to safely 
restrain and immobilize combative subjects—without facing the 
complications and dangers associated with the traditional restraint 
 
 10. Compare the modern electronic taser device with the “Tucker Telephone,” a hand-
cranked device used as late as the 1960s that generated electric shocks to sensitive body parts 
such as the genitalia. 
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methods like hogtying”11). Much of this high-tech weaponry is 
subject to abuse by correctional staff. Ironically, such weaponry is 
purportedly employed as a means to minimize injuries to both staff 
and inmates. Use of this weaponry often results in no detectable 
injuries, even when it is misused by personnel. However, it almost 
always causes significant pain to the prisoner on whom it is 
employed. In my experience, all too often in American corrections 
such weaponry is used as a “first strike” response, before other less 
painful and injurious tactics are exhausted or thoughtfully considered. 
Moreover, I have too often observed confinement operations that 
either fail to develop policies that properly limit weaponry to very 
narrow circumstances, or, if such policies are in place, supervisory 
staff fail to properly enforce them.  
The use of such weaponry in American corrections has come into 
vogue with the advent of “super” or “ultra” maximum security 
prisons in which to house “super-predators.”12 It is these demonized 
super-predators that are very often the recipients of this high-tech 
weaponry, and it is the rhetoric about them that provides an 
ideological justification for unprecedented levels of force, even 
though hard-core troublemakers requiring maximum security 
confinement are hardly a new phenomenon in corrections. 
The contribution of high-tech (and some low-tech) weaponry to 
patterns of de facto corporal punishment is illustrated by a federal 
district court decision rendered in 1995 involving one of the nation’s 
most modern supermax facilities operated by the California 
Department of Corrections, the Pelican Bay State Prison, located in 
the remote northeast corner of the state.13 This facility, built to house 
“the worst of the worst” of California’s offenders, was touted as the 
prison of the future, employing cutting-edge technology with state-
 
 11. Advertisement: The Body Guard Restraining Systems (on file with the author). 
Hogtying is a restraint procedure in which the subject's handcuffs are tied or connected to 
his/her ankle restraints. 
 12. For a discussion of supermax prisons see Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons: 
Overview and General Considerations, NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, January 1999, 
http://www.nicic.org/Library/016993. For a discussion of super-predators, see WILLIAM J. 
BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR 
AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996). 
 13. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d and remanded, 150 F.3d 
1030 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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of-the-art security devices. The Pelican Bay State Prison security 
force had at their disposal a wide array of non-lethal weaponry such 
as tasers (both hand-held and with projectile darts), hand-held 
aerosols dispensing pepper spray, and tear gas canisters (filled with 
wood block or rubber pellet projectiles) fired at high velocity from a 
37mm gas gun. Among the conditions of confinement challenged by 
the prisoners at Pelican Bay State Prison in Madrid v. Gomez14 was 
that staff routinely engaged in the unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain and the use of excessive force.15 The Madrid court found: 
[T]hat the extent to which force is misused at Pelican Bay, 
combined with the flagrant and pervasive failures in 
defendants’ systems for controlling the use of force reveal 
more than just deliberate indifference: they reveal an 
affirmative management strategy to permit the use of excessive 
force for the purposes of punishment and deterrence.16 
Excessive and unnecessary force at Pelican Bay was used in a 
variety of circumstances and settings, and staff employed both their 
bare hands and a variety of instruments. Prisoners were left naked in 
outdoor holding cages during inclement weather.17 Fetal restraints 
and “hogtying” were commonplace.18 Prisoners were routinely shot 
with rubber pellets discharged with high velocity from 37mm gas 
guns.19 Other prisoners were shot with high-powered rifles for fist 
fights.20 One mentally ill prisoner suffered second- and third-degree 
burns over one-third of his body when he was given a bath in 
scalding water in the prison infirmary one week after biting a guard.21 
Injuries sustained by prisoners ranged from lost teeth and bone 
fractures22 to fatal gunshot wounds.23 In addressing the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1156. 
 16. Id. at 1199. 
 17. Id. at 1171. 
 18. Id. at 1168. 
 19. Id. at 1175.  
 20. Id. at 1179 n.54. 
 21. Id. at 1166. 
 22. Id. at 1189 n.78. 
 23. Id. at 1180 n.55. 
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pain,24 the court observed that “while this simple phrase articulates 
the legal standard, dry words on paper cannot adequately capture the 
senseless suffering and sometimes wretched misery that defendants’ 
unconstitutional practices leave in their wake.”25 
Unlawful cell extractions at Pelican Bay illustrate how de facto 
corporal punishment is often cloaked with an air of legitimacy or 
facial validity. They were almost always initiated to address 
appropriate security goals such as recovering contraband or enforcing 
a lawful order.26 However, the court observed that certain processes, 
even when properly performed for legitimate security concerns, can 
be “undeniably violent maneuver[s] which can involve several 
weapons, including [37] millimeter gas guns, tasers, short metal 
batons, and mace.”27 Examination of the prison’s practice shows that 
force used in this nominally security-driven practice was often vastly 
disproportionate to the actual need or risk that prison staff faced.28 In 
one instance, for example, a prisoner had refused to relinquish his 
dinner tray. He was unarmed, locked securely in his cell and weighed 
some 130 pounds.29 A cell extraction team of five officers and a 
sergeant, prior to entering the cell, discharged two multiple baton 
rounds fired from a 37mm gun, hitting the prisoner in the groin, 
dispensed two bursts of mace, and then fired two taser cartridges.30 
The team then entered the cell and “restrained [the prisoner] after a 
brief struggle.”31 The prisoner, as reported by staff, sustained “minor 
abrasions and bruises” that included bruising to the head, neck, and 
back with swelling to both eyes and large bruises to the legs and 
ankles.32 The notion that this level of force, firepower, and infliction 
of injury was necessary because a small man locked in a high-
security cell would not return his dinner tray is beyond all reason and 
can only be characterized as de facto corporal punishment. 
 
 24. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (forbidding the use of cruel and unusual punishment). 
 25. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1280. 
 26. See id. at 1172. 
 27. Id. at 1172. Throughout its opinion the court refers to this gun as a 38mm gun.  In fact, 
it is a 37mm gun. 
 28. Id. at 1178. 
 29. Id. at 1176–77. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1177. 
 32. Id. 
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While we certainly must be circumspect in generalizing too much 
from the Pelican Bay litigation, this high-profile prison was opened 
with trained staff supported by experienced corrections managers, an 
arsenal of high-tech weaponry and an uncrowded state-of-the-art 
facility. Notwithstanding these advantages, which many American 
confinement operations do not have, the facility staff routinely 
employed extreme levels of force justified under the rubric of 
achieving legitimate security objectives.  
A more recent example took place in a large metropolitan jail 
system in the South and involved the routine use of pepper spray in 
passive resistance situations in which the mere refusal to obey a 
lawful order—unaccompanied by an immediate physical threat—
prompted such action. In other words, pepper spray was routinely and 
immediately employed as a “first strike” tactic regardless of the level 
of threat to the safety or security of staff. Such incidents involved the 
use of this chemical agent on a pregnant detainee locked securely in 
her cell, on a detainee who was simply requesting the return of a leg 
brace, on a detainee on suicide watch who was observed picking at a 
wound on his arm, on a detainee observed masturbating in his cell, 
and on cuffed detainees who posed no immediate threat of physical 
harm to staff. A pattern clearly emerged indicating that the chemical 
agent had become a means to immediately impose de facto corporal 
punishment on prisoners violating any facility rule, regardless of the 
threat to security or staff safety. 
Of course, such abuses are not limited to only those systems that 
employ non-lethal weaponry. I have been involved in numerous cases 
in which staff members’ fists and feet were employed either 
prematurely or needlessly to vulnerable areas of the body such as the 
head, groin and kidneys when other, less injurious control tactics 
could have been more effectively employed to control, neutralize or 
immobilize a disruptive prisoner. The routine use of needlessly 
injurious, hard-impact strikes to the head of a prisoner in those 
instances in which some level of control is necessary is no less an 
abuse of use of force standards or legal constraints than when they 
are employed solely for punishment. In other words, if a self-defense 
tactic such as non-blunt force can effectively neutralize a disruptive 
prisoner, it is not appropriate to strike the prisoner with blunt force to 
the head, especially when such strikes often do not actually neutralize 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the aggressing inmate. In fact, such tactics often create a purely 
retaliatory cycle of violence in which both the officer and prisoner 
sustain injuries and the degree of injuries sustained is more serious. 
It should be noted that, in these aforementioned cases, the typical 
refrain by defendants in response to systemic allegations of unlawful 
force was their claim that each use of force incident must be 
evaluated individually, based on the officer’s subjective assessment 
of the need and amount of force employed. While this is certainly 
relevant to a review or investigation of a particular use of force 
incident, this should not preclude the use of vitally important 
aggregate or cumulative use of force data in evaluating patterns and 
practices of staff use of force.  
Having conducted countless investigations and inquiries into 
systemic use of force in confinement operations, in addition to 
monitoring use of force compliance in both large and small facilities 
and systems across the country, it would be a dereliction of my duties 
in those cases to have ignored trends, patterns and cumulative data. If 
one has identified, through that data, that a particular system or 
facility experiences a notably higher rate of serious injuries caused 
from a equally high rate of hard-impact strikes to vulnerable areas of 
the body, and, further, that these rates are aberrational when 
compared to other confinement operations, regardless of “the 
perception” of individual officers in individual cases, any competent 
manager would affirmatively seek alternative, but no less effective, 
control mechanisms. 
Objective use of force data is sorely lacking in American 
corrections and makes comparative analysis difficult. For instance, if 
one system is able to effectively and safely use force techniques that 
rarely involve hard-impact strikes or weaponry, other correctional 
managers could seek to replicate their success and thereby 
significantly reduce costly injuries to both inmates and staff. Very 
few confinement operations with which I am familiar use a 
standardized and comprehensive data collection system in evaluating 
use of force patterns or practice. 
As we are now fully ensconced in the age of the “super max 
prison” where “super predators” are confined in a “no frills” 
environment after they have had “three strikes,” use of force appears 
to be more easily sanctioned and justified than it otherwise would be. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/12
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However, the basic rule of law that governs the use of excessive or 
unnecessary force in prisons and jails is no less applicable to the 
“worst of the worst” than any other confined person. Moreover, while 
the courts should remain reluctant to superintend the day-to-day 
operation of corrections facilities, they must also remain steadfast in 
their refusal to embrace the logic that allows corrections 
professionals to modify the rule of law governing use of force in such 
a way that it can be used to punish prisoners rather than control them. 
As so eloquently suggested by the prisoners’ attorney in her opening 
statement in Madrid “we, the people, are [not] free to act lawlessly 
because the people that we brutalize have themselves violated the 
law.”33 
On a final note, I want to address a disturbing pattern that has 
emerged during the course of my work in the past five to seven years. 
During this time, I have been involved with more than twenty in-
custody death cases resulting from staff use of force, more often than 
not involving mentally ill prisoners. Often times these deaths are the 
result of positional, compression or restraint asphyxiation. It is 
difficult to know how often this happens in American corrections as 
there is no central repository for specific reporting on such deaths. 
However, the cases in which I have direct knowledge fall into a very 
distinct and disturbing pattern: once you are into the actual 
application of force, you have a “death escalation cycle”; as the 
mentally ill inmate is subject to a greater level of force, he develops a 
greater level of anxiety and his resistance escalates accordingly, 
which, in turn, requires a greater escalation of force.34 
The normally high risks associated with any major use of force 
increase exponentially when it is used prematurely or needlessly on a 
mentally ill prisoner. I would urge the Commission to place this 
phenomenon on its agenda so that further study can be made to better 
inform the American corrections community on how to more 
effectively and safely employ force when it involves a mentally ill 
 
 33. From Opening Statement by Susan Creighton, Attorney for Plaintiffs, PRISON FOCUS 
(Cal. Prison Focus, S.F., Cal.), Winter 2002, at 10 (reproducing a portion of Ms. Creighton’s 
opening statement in Madrid). 
 34. See SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: 
U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (Joseph Saunders & James Ross eds., 
2003). 
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prisoner. Any standards that may emerge from such a study should 
require mental health care intervention, if at all possible, prior to the 
actual application of force for any prisoner with a history of mental 
illness or any prisoner exhibiting behaviors commonly associated 
with mental illness or impairments. 
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